Technological Regimes and Firm Survival: Evidence across Sectors and over Time by Pei-Chou Lin & Deng-Shing Huang
中央研究院經濟所學術研討論文 
IEAS Working Paper 
 
 
Technological Regimes and Firm Survival:   
Evidence across Sectors and over Time 
Pei-Chou Lin and Deng-Shing Huang 





Institute of Economics 
Academia Sinica 




中央研究院  經濟研究所 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, ACADEMIA SINICA 
TAIWAN 
copyright © 2006 (Pei-Chou Lin and Deng-Shing Huang) 0
Technological Regimes and Firm Survival:
Evidence across Sectors and over Time
!
Pei-Chou Lin
Department of Public Finance, Jin-Wen Institute of Technology
Deng-Shing Huang
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
October 2006
Abstract:
In addition to the usual variables representing firm- and industry-specific
features  t h a t   i mp a c t   t h e   f i r m’ s   s u r v i v a l ,   t h i s   p a p e r   u s e s   t h r e e   R&D related
variables to reflect two Schumpeterian technological regimes: creative
destruction (the entrepreneurial regime) and creative accumulation (the
routinized regime). After controlling for age, size, entry barriers, capital
intensity, the profit margin, the concentration ratio, the profit-cost ratio and
entry rates, the empirical results confirm the theoretical relationship between
technological regimes and the survival rate of new firms: new firms are more
likely to survive under the entrepreneurial regime. Moreover, this effect is
larger within the younger cohorts of firms than within the older ones.
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I. Introduction
The survival rate of firms did not receive much attention in the literature
until the 1980s. Being stimulated by Gibrat’ s Law (1931), which states that a
firm’ s performance is irrelevant to its size or scale, most of the empirical
studies in the 1950s and 1960s focused on the relationship between the
growth rate and firm size by making use of firm-level data. However,
Mansfield (1962) also considered small-sized firms in his sample and found a
negative relationship between growth and initial size, which was clear
evidence against Gibrat’ s Law. To explain his striking result, Mansfield (1962)
raised the problem of sample selection bias, i.e. it may be harder for small
firms to survive and thus firms that we observe in our sample are those that
are more efficient
1.
To explain the empirical evidence against Gibrat’ s Law and the
differences in survival chances, economists have relied on models that
emphasize firm heterogeneity and market selection. For example, Jovanovic
(1982) has provided a passive learning model where firms learn about their
efficiency as they operate in the industry. Alternatively, Ericson and Pakes (1995
and 1998) have provided an active learning model, emphasizing the role of a firm’ s
active research and exploration while perceiving a profit opportunity in a certain
industry. Accordingly, age and size should be positively linked to the survival
rate of firms. Following these random selection theories, some empirical
studies investigating the link between size/age and survival have been put
forward. For example, Evans (1987a, 1987b), Hall (1987), Dunne, et al.
(1989), Dunne and Hughes (1994), and Lotti, et al. (2003) have found
empirical support for the positive relationships between a firm’ ssize and its
survival and between a firm’ s age and its survival.
Other studies have focused on industry-specific factors. For example, Agarwal
and Audretsch (1999, 2001) have investigated the impact of the life cycle and the
technology intensity of industry on the relationship between firm size and its survival.
Their empirical results suggest that in the mature stage of an industry smaller firms
are not necessarily confronted with a lower likelihood of survival.
In more general terms, the survival rates of new firms vary systematically
across industries, as observed by Dunne, et al. (1989). To explain this
observation, industry-specific factors such as the intensity of innovation, the2
concentration ratio, the minimum efficient scale (for this point in the Finnish
economy see also Nurmi, 2006), the profit rate and industry growth are
considered in the empirical studies performed by Audretsch (1991 and 1995).
His empirical tests are based on the hypothesis well-posited by Geroski (1995,
p.21), that ‘ the growth and survival prospects of new firms will depend on
their ability to learn about their environment, and to link changes in their
choices of strategy to the changing configuration of that environment … (t)he
more turbulent the market environment, the more likely it is that firms will
fail to cope. If the process of entry continually throws up new aspirants for
market places, then slow learning coupled with a turbulent environment
means that high entry rates will be observed jointly with high failure rates.’
The empirical evidence confirms the conclusion also put forward by Geroski
(1995, p.23) that ‘ entry appears to be relatively easy, but survival is not’ .
Thus - on the basis of the previous literature - factors affecting the
survival rate of a newborn firm can be classified into two categories: firm-
and industry-specific. As far as firm-specific factors are concerned, the most
important are age and size,
2 while the most important industry-specific factors
are more related to market structure and to the extent of entry barriers.
However, an interesting aspect, which is seldom considered in the
empirical studies on survival, is the type of “ technological regime” .
According to Neo-Schumpeterian economists such as Nelson and Winter
(1982), Winter (1984), Dosi (1988), Malerba and Orsenigo (1993, 1995, 1996)
and Breschi, et al. (2000), there are two types of technological regimes:
creative destruction and creative accumulation.
The creative destruction, also referred to as the Entrepreneurial Regime,
refers to technological innovations that tend to replace the old technology, or
more specifically, to shorten the life cycle of the technology being adopted by
the established incumbent firms. In other words, this regime is characterized
by technologies with high opportunities, low appropriability and low
cumulativeness, as discussed in Malerba and Orsenigo (1993) and denoted as
Schumpeter Mark I in Breschi, et al. (2000).
3 Thus innovation is naturally
brought about by new firms, while the established older firms have less of an
incentive to evolve. Consequently, an industry subjected to the technology
regime of creative destruction tends to have lower entry barriers, and new
firms are likely to dominate the innovation activities of the industry.
Accordingly, new firms in this type of industry are more likely to survive, as3
stated by Van Dijk (2000) and Audretsch (2001).
The other type of technology regime, referred to as the Routinized
Regime, is instead characterized by creative accumulation technology, that is,
innovation makes the prevailing technology deeper and more efficient to serve
the current market or improve production processes, and usually requires
more experience in the related industry or market. More specifically, this
regime is characterized by technologies with lower opportunity, higher
appropriability and higher cumulativeness as discussed in Malerba and
Orsenigo (1993) and denoted as Schumpeter Mark II in Breschi, et al. (2000).
Thus the experienced incumbent firms have innovative comparative
advantages in such kinds of industries. As a result, the entry barriers will be
higher and the survival rate for the new firms will be lower (see Van Dijk,
2000 and Audretsch, 2001).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
the data and the related econometric specification, Section III reports the
empirical results and Section IV concludes.
II. Methodology
Data and Specification
The firm-level data are drawn from the census surveys conducted by the
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS),
Executive Yuan, Taiwan in 1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996. This is an official
survey containing information on many firm-level characteristics such as
employment, R&D expenditures, sales, capital, profit and output, etc.
Moreover, it also contains a firm’ s ID that is constant over the four different
periods of the survey, and the 4-digit industry classification of each firm’ s
product. The availability of the firm’ s ID allows us to trace the status of each
individual firm across different census years, and to build a longitudinal
dataset. Thus, we can observe whether a firm listed in a given census year, say,
1991, can survive for another five years or not. In addition, the industry
classification allows us to compute some industry specific variables, such us
R&D intensity, and entry ratios, etc. to suit our goal of testing the hypothesis
concerning technological regimes.
Being conducted at five-year intervals, the drawback of the dataset is that4
it omits the exit and entry of firms between the census years. In addition,
there is no information regarding the date when the firm was in fact
established, or about the personal characteristics of the establishers.
Consequently, as noted earlier, the personal characteristics cannot be included
in our study, although they may also affect the hazard rate of firms as
addressed in the literature.
To suit our objective, we select all the firms in the 1991 census, or a total
of 132,449 firms. Our empirical strategy is to conduct a survival test over the
period 1991-1996. Then, via the firm’ s ID number, we will trace each of the
selected firms in the census data for 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996 to establish a
longitudinal dataset. A surviving firm is defined as a firm in the census data
for 1991 that not only appears again in the 1996 census data but also remains
in the same 4-digit industry. In other words, a firm that has switched to
another industry during the period from 1991 to 1996 is regarded as not
surviving. Accordingly, we construct a SURV dummy variable that takes on a
value of one for a surviving firm and zero for one that does not survive.
In addition, firms can be categorized into three cohorts based on their age
as follows:
(1) The cohort for 1981 includes firms that already exist in the 1981 census
data, and comprises 28,295 firms. Obviously they are firms in existence
for more than 10 years, 10 AGE  , and constitute the oldest group of
firms in our sample. The corresponding dummy variable is denoted as
COH81, which takes on a value of one for observations in this group, and
a value of zero otherwise.
(2) The cohort for 1986 is composed of firms that newly appear in the 1986
census data, i.e., firms at least 5 years of age but less than 10 years of age,
5 10 AGE   . There are 33,473 firms in the group. The dummy COH86
takes on a value of one if the observation belongs to this cohort, and zero
otherwise.
(3) The cohort for 1991 denotes firms that newly appear in the 1991 census
data, i.e., firms less than 5 years of age, 5 AGE  . This group contains
70,682 firms. The dummy variable, COH91, equals one if the observation
belongs to this cohort, and zero otherwise.
Model and Variables5
There are many factors determining the survival rate of a firm as
discussed in the related literature. As noted earlier, these can be divided into
two categories: firm-specific factors and industry-specific factors. To estimate
the effects of these factors on the determination of the survival rate, we use
the approach of the binary probit model, simply because of the limitations of
the data structure. In other words, it is because there is no information
regarding a firms’ starting year, and due to the drawback of the 5-year interval
that makes the exit and entry of firms between two census years unobservable,
that the alternative approach of the hazard rate function adopted in some of
the related literature is not feasible. More specifically, the discrete variable of
SURV is considered as the dependent variable in a probit regression, and the
explanatory variables to be included are measured as described below:
Firm-specific Factors
In regard to the firm-specific factors affecting the survival rate, the two
most important are age and size. As discussed earlier, new and small size
firms tend to have lower survival rates. From the age point of view, therefore,
the oldest cohort in our sample, that is, the 1981 cohort, should have the
highest survival rate, and the youngest group of firms, the 1991 cohort,
should be expected to have the lowest survival rate. Hence, the estimated
coefficient of the cohort dummy COH81 is expected to be bigger than that of
COH86, which in turn is bigger than that of COH91.
A few simple statistics roughly confirm this viewpoint, as shown in Table
I. On average, the survival rate for the whole sample is 55.21%. However, the
survival rate for the oldest group, the 1981 cohort, is 60.94%, which is higher
than the 57.84% for the 1986 cohort, which in turn is higher than the 51.67%
for the youngest cohort, or the 1991 cohort.
Table I
Survival Rate and Age of Taiwanese Firms
Cohort Total 1981 1986 1991
Number of
Firms
132449 28295 33473 70682
Surviving
Firms
73125 17243 19361 36521
Survival Rate 55.21% 60.94% 57.84% 51.67%6
Firm size and the survival rate are positively correlated as commonly
found in the literature. This is also supported by a first glimpse at our sample.
Table II below computes the survival rate for each scale of firms. For the
group of firms with the largest scale (Scale 5, in the last column of Table II),
the survival rate is 70.12%, and the smaller the scale, the smaller is the
survival rate. For the smallest scale firms (Scale 1 in Table II), the survival
rate is the lowest at 52.42%.
Table II
Scale of Firm and Survival Rate
Firm Size Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5
Number of
Firms
86706 37702 4809 1899 1333
Surviving
Firms
45454 22345 3146 1245 935
Survival Rate 52.42% 59.26% 65.41% 65.57% 70.12%
The scales are defined as follows: scale 1= employment<10, scale 2=10< employment<50,
scale 3=50<employment<100, scale 4= 100<employment<200, and scale 5=
200<employment.
Industry-specific Factors
There are also many industry-specific factors affecting the survival rates.
Based on our review of the literature, the variables to be considered in our
regression are as follows (see also Table III for the summary and related
definitions):
Capital Intensity The average capital input per real output value for each
4-digit industry is computed and denoted as KQR. Intuitively, a higher capital
intensity to some extent reflects less flexibility in terms of adjusting to
market turbulence, and will thus have a negative effect on the survival rate.
On the other hand, the KQR can be considered to be a proxy for sunk costs
and barriers to entry as well as barriers to exit, thus increasing the likelihood
of survival of the incumbent firms. See Cabral (1995, 1997) for a discussion.
Consequently, the effect of KQR on the survival rate is ambiguous, and
depends on which of the forces dominates.7
Market Environment In addition, four other variables that are indicators of
the market environment, or the degree of competitiveness, are designed for
each of the 4-digit industries. They are HH (the Hirschman-Herfindahl
concentration index), PCM (the profit margin), MES (the minimum efficient
scale)
4 and ENTR (the entry rate of new firms). Theoretically, the first three
measures (i.e., HH, PCM and MES) are negatively related to the degree of
competitiveness of the market. That is, the higher the three indexes, the lower
the degree of competitiveness and thus the greater is the likelihood of a firm
surviving. However, the entry rate of new firms (ENTR) reflects the market
turbulence of an industry. A higher ENTR signals a higher degree of market
turbulence, thus corresponding to a lower survival rate.
5
Technology Regime Three R&D related variables are designed for the
regression to capture the relationship between technology regimes and the
survival rate. They are RDI (R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D
expenditure to total employment for each 4-digit industry), RDN (the R&D
share of new firms, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure by new firms to
the total R&D expenditure of the industry as a whole), and finally CORR (the
rank correlation coefficient between the RDI and Employment).
Theoretically, a higher R&D intensity (RDI) implies higher innovation
opportunities for the industry, thus providing better conditions for the survival
of the new firms. In other words, a higher RDI implies that the more likely
that the industry is subjected to the so-called entrepreneur regime, the more
likely that the survival rate for new firms will be higher. That is, for the 1991
cohort the estimated coefficient for RDI is expected to be greater than that for
the 1986 cohort, which in turn is greater than that for the 1981 cohort. In the
case of the pooled sample, we consider the RDI and the cross dummies of
COH86RDI (defined as COH86 times RDI) and COH91RDI (defined as
COH91 times RDI), and expect to find a positive coefficient for both
COH91RDI and COH86RDI, and a larger coefficient for COH91RDI than for
COH86RDI. On the other hand, the RDI may also reflect the sunk costs,
which may tend to deter the likelihood that the incumbent firms will exit the
market and also discourage the entry of new firms. Consequently, the effect of
RDI on the survival rate becomes ambiguous.
A higher RDN indicates that the more that the innovation activities come
from the new firms, the more likely it is that the technology regime will
exhibit creative destruction, or be of the so-called entrepreneur regime.8
Therefore, a higher RDN implies a better opportunity for entry through
innovation, and a higher survival rate for new firms. Accordingly, we would
expect that for an industry with a high RDN, the youngest cohort (1991)
should have the highest survival rate, while the oldest cohort (1981) should
have the lowest survival rate. To test this hypothesis, the cross dummies of
COH86RDN (defined as COH86 times RDN) and COH91RDN (defined as
COH91 times RDN) are considered in the regression involving the whole of
the sample data. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for COH91RDN is
expected to be greater than that for COH86RDN.
The last technology regime-related variable is CORR, which is defined as
the rank correlation coefficient between the RDI and employment for each
4-digit industry. The higher the CORR, the more R&D that will be conducted
by the big firms, reflecting a likely environment that is beneficial for big
firms to conduct innovation, that is, a routinized regime. In the extreme, a
zero CORR indicates no relationship between firm size and R&D intensity,
thus implying a better environment for new firms to survive, i.e. an
entrepreneur regime. To sum up, theoretically speaking, the lower the CORR,
the more likely the industry will be characterized by the entrepreneur
technology regime, and thus the environment will be more beneficial for new
firms seeking to survive. On the contrary, a higher CORR implies that it is
more likely that the underlying industry will be characterized by a routinized
regime, and will thus be less beneficial to the new firms. As a result, we
would expect that the coefficient for COH91CORR will be less than the
coefficient for COH86CORR, where COH91CORR is COH91 times CORR,
and COH86CORR is COH86 times CORR. For convenience, the variables are
listed in Table III. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are
reported in Table IV, and the matrix of correlation coefficients is reported in
the Appendix as Table A1.9
Table III




SURV Surviving Dummy, it takes a value of 1 for a surviving
firm (defined as above), otherwise 0
LE91 (+) Log (Employment of each Firm in 1991)
COH81 (base) Cohort Dummy, it takes a value of 1 for firms newly
appearing in 1981, otherwise 0. Note this cohort will be
used as the base group, and thus will not be included in
the regression. (Oldest cohort)
COH86 (-) Cohort Dummy, it takes a value of 1 for firms newly
appearing in 1986, otherwise 0. (Middle aged cohort)
COH91 (-) Cohort Dummy, it takes a value of 1 for firms newly
appearing in 1991, otherwise 0. (Youngest cohort)
KQR (-) Capital/Real Output for each 4-digit industry
HH (+) Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, defined as the sum of
squares of each firm’ s output share for each 4-digit
industry
PCM (+) Profit/Output Ratio for each 4-digit industry
MES (+) Minimum Efficient Scale Index for each 4-digit industry.
Defined as the ratio of the median firm’ s scale to the
mean scale for each 4-digit industry
ENTR (-) Entry Rate (number of new firms/total number of firms)
for each 4-digit industry






RDN R&D share of new firms, the ratio of New Firms’ R&D /












Descriptive Statistics of Industry-Specific Variables
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
LE91 129 162.749 1299 20995 3.1111 14743
ENTR 129 0.68517 0.16278 88.3863 0 1
RDN 129 0.13069 0.25143 16.8593 0 1
RDI 129 9.31667 15.03448 1202 0 72.5873
CORR 129 0.20578 0.14618 26.5454 -0.4083 0.737
PCM 129 0.18214 0.07507 23.4964 0.0932 0.7047
KQR 129 0.8187 0.44355 105.6119 0.1298 3.6637
HH 129 0.09672 0.18565 12.4773 0.0008 1
MES 129 0.38402 0.17137 49.5381 0.0106 1
Note: N= No. of Observations (a total of 129 sectors under the 4-digit industry
classification in the census).
III. Empirical Results
The regression results from the binary probit model for the whole sample
are reported in Table V.
6 Three models, denoted as Models A, B and C, are
considered in the report. Model A contains independent variable LE91 (firm
size), the cohort dummies (age) of COH86 and COH91 (i.e., the base cohort is
that for 1981 denoted by COH81), and three regime-related variables, namely,
RDI, RDN and CORR, as shown in the second column of Table V. In addition,
Models B and C contain more industry-specific variables, such as KQR (the
Capital/Output Ratio), HH (the Herfindhal Index of Concentration), PCM (the
Profit Margin), MES (the Minimum Efficient Scale) and ENTR (the Entry
Rate). Note that the HH and PCM variables are considered alternatively in
Models B and C, due to its significant correlation as shown in Table A1 in the11
Appendix.
In another experiment, we try the model where we drop RDI and its
related variables COH86RDI and COH91RDI, and find no significant change
in the estimated coefficient. Hence, the results are not reported here but are
available upon request.
Using the pooled sample allows us to test the difference in terms of the
estimated coefficient between different cohorts. For this purpose, cohort
dummies are included in the explanatory variables, including COH86 and
COH91. Note that we pick the oldest cohort (age greater than 10 years) as the
base group so that the dummy for COH81 is excluded from the regression. To
test the relationship between the technological regimes and the survival rate
of new firms, the cross dummies of R&D-related measures and different
cohorts are considered, such as COH86RDI, COH91RDI; COH86RDN,
COH91RDN; and COH86CORR, COH91CORR. The results are as follows:
Size, Age and Survival
The relationship between firm size and the survival rate is represented by
the coefficient of LE91 (the log of employment in 1991). The estimated
coefficients are significantly positive for each of the Models A, B and C. This
result indicates the positive relationship between firm size and the survival
rate, which is consistent with the stylized fact commonly observed in the
literature.
The firm’ s age is positively linked to the survival rate, according to the
self-selection theory of Jovanovic (1982). Therefore, we would expect the
survival rate for the 1981 cohort to be greater than that for the 1986 cohort,
which in turn will be greater than that for the 1991 cohort. Our empirical
results confirm this relationship, as shown in Table V. In addition to those
variables considered in the single cohort sample (not reported), we include
two cohort dummies COH86 and COH91, to test whether the survival rates
are different across cohorts. Using the 1981 cohort as the benchmark, if age is
positively related to survival, then we would expect not only a negative
coefficient for COH86 and COH91, but also a smaller coefficient for COH91.
In fact, this is supported by the empirical results of all three models in Table
V, where the estimated coefficients for COH86 and COH91 are – 0.0042,
and – 0.0641, respectively, for Model A, – 0.0102 and – 0.0793 for Model B,
and -0.0105 and -0.0794 for Model C, although the coefficients for COH8612
are not significant in all three models. In other words, the empirical evidence
confirms that younger firms have a lower survival rate.
Entry Barriers and Survival
Many industry-specific factors are considered in the regressions of Model
B and Model C. As noted earlier, for every 4-digit industry, KQR, HH, PCM,
MES, ENTR, RDI, RDN, and CORR are measured. These variables can be
divided into two categories: one relating to the identification of the
technological regime (RDI, RDN and CORR), and the other relating to
commonly adopted industry-level variables (KQR, HH, PCM, MES and
ENTR).
For the group of non-technology related variables, namely, KQR, HH,
PCM, MES, and ENTR, the empirical results can be summarized as follows:
KQR (Capital/Real Output): The estimated coefficients for KQR are
significantly negative for both Models B (-.0472, significant at the 5% level)
and C (-0.0356, also significant at the 5% level). This result may reflect the
fact that high capital dependence reduces the operational flexibility in
responding to market fluctuations and thus makes a firm more likely to fail.
As discussed earlier, the variable KQR, as a proxy for sunk cost, which will
decrease the incentive of the incumbent firm to exit (i.e., make it more likely
to stay in business and be observed as surviving), will be positively related to
survival. That is, if the sunk-cost effect is big enough to dominate the result,
we would expect the estimated coefficient for KQR to be positive. However,
it seems that our empirical results do not support this sunk-cost effect as
being big enough.
HH (Concentration Index of Output Share): The estimated coefficients are
positive, as shown in Model B. That is, the higher the concentration of the
output share in a given industry, the more likely it is that a firm will survive.
This reflects the fact that, the lower the degree of competitiveness, the more
likely it is that a firm will survive.
PCM (Profit/Output Ratio): The estimated coefficients are positive and
significant as shown in Model C, in which the PCM is adopted to replace the
variable for HH in Model B. Like HH, this index also reflects the degree of
competitiveness for the underlying industry, as indicated by the high13
correlation coefficient of 0.6301 between the two variables (see Table A1 in
the Appendix). That is, a higher profit margin, as represented by a higher
PCM, implies lower competitiveness in the market, and corresponds to a
higher survival rate for firms.
MES (Minimum Efficient Scale): The estimated coefficients are also
significantly positive for all the regressions; that is, 0.9715 in Model B and
0.8894 in Model C. A higher MES reflects a lower degree of competitiveness,
and hence makes firms within the industry survive more easily.
ENTR (the Entry Rate) measures the ratio of the number of new firms
(appearing in the 1991 census data but not in the previous survey) to the total
number of firms for each 4-digit industry. A higher ENTR indicates higher
market turbulence or fiercer competitiveness, as noted in the literature. Hence,
we would expect a negative relationship between the ENTR and the survival
rate. This hypothesis is empirically supported by our empirical results, as
shown in Table V, in which the estimated coefficients for ENTR in Models B
and C are -0.5121 and -0.5475, respectively.
To sum up, our empirical results show that among those industry-specific
variables, both KOR (the capital/output ratio, denoting the degree of sunk
cost and/or the flexibility of adjustment to market variation) and ENTR (the
new firms’ entry ratio, reflecting the degree of competitiveness in an industry)
are negatively related to the survival rate of new firms. On the contrary, the
other three variables for HH (the concentration index), PCM (the level of the
profit margin) and MES (the minimum efficient scale), all reflecting the level
of the entry barriers, are positively related to the survival rate of new firms.
All of these results consistently provide empirical support for the theoretical
relationship where the lower the degree of competitiveness, the more likely it
is that a firm will survive.
Technological Regimes and Survival
The three variables RDI, RDN and CORR are designed to capture the
relationship between technological regimes and the survival rate.
RDI (R&D intensity, measured by the ratio of R&D/Employment): As noted
earlier, a higher RDI implies that the industry is characterized by the
entrepreneur regime of technology, and hence will provide better
opportunities for new firms to enter and survive. Thus, it is expected that, the14
higher the RDI, the higher will be the survival rate for the youngest cohort
(that is, 1991) as compared with that for the 1986 cohort, which in turn will
have a higher survival rate than the 1981 cohort. The empirical results in
Table V weakly confirm this hypothesis, as shown by comparing the
coefficient of the cross dummies of COH91RDI and COH86RDI. All three
Models A, B and C exhibit a larger coefficient for COH91RDI than for
COH86RDI, although only one of the coefficients (COH91RDI in Model A) is
significant.
RDN (R&D share of new firms): Like RDI, a higher RDN implies better
innovation opportunities for new firms, thus helping new firms to overcome
the disadvantages of scale and other market barriers, and hence indicating the
features of the entrepreneur regime for the underlying industry. Thus, we
would expect RDN to have  a   ‘ higher’ positive effect on the survival rate for
newer firms. This is indeed supported by the empirical results. As shown in
Table V, all three models exhibit significantly positive coefficients for
COH86RDN and COH91RDN. In addition, the younger cohort’ s cross-dummy
with RDN has a larger coefficient than that of the older cohort. For example,
in Model B we have 0.3601 (COH91RDN), which is greater than 0.2953
(COH86RDN), which in turn is greater than -0.3052 (RDN). A similar pattern
can be found in Model C. The economic meaning of this result deserves a
more explicit interpretation. The negative coefficient for RDN indicates that,
if the oldest cohort (that is COHORT 1981) is operating in the industry where
the new firms’ R&D is more active, it is more likely to fail. On the other hand,
a positive and larger coefficient for COH86RDN and an even larger one for
COH91RDN than that of RDN, indicates that the younger the cohort, the more
likely it is that the firms will survive in an industry where the new firm’ s
R&D is more active.
CORR (Rank Correlation Coefficient between RDI and Employment): As
discussed earlier, a higher CORR implies that the underling industry is more
likely to be subjected to the routinized regime of technology, which works
against the newer firm. Thus, we would expect a negative relationship
between the CORR and the survival rate for the younger cohort than for the
older cohort. Table V confirms this hypothesis, as shown by comparing the
estimated coefficients of the two cross dummies of COH91CORR and
COH86CORR, (– 1.1997 and – 0.682, respectively, for Model A, – 1.0408
and – 0.5928, respectively, for Model B, and -0.9975 and -0.5602, respectively,
for Model C).15
To sum up, our empirical results show that in an industry with higher
R&D intensity (RDI), higher innovation opportunities (R&D shares for new
firms, RDN) and lower accumulation (CORR- correlation between the RDI
and employment), new firms are more likely to survive. On the contrary, in an
industry with lower RDI and RDN and a higher CORR, new firms are less
likely to survive. In other words, our empirical findings support the
theoretical relationship between the technological regimes and firm survival,
as addressed by the Neo-Schumpeterian economists. That is, new firms are
more likely to survive in an industry characterized by an entrepreneur regime,
but are less likely to survive under a routinized regime. In addition, the
finding emerges from the data that this divide between the two technological
regimes is more important for younger cohorts than for the older ones.
Table V
Probit Regression of Survival for Taiwanese Firms
Dependent Variable: SURV



























RDI 0.0010 (0.0009) 0.0021 (0.0009)
** 0.0016 (0.0009)
COH86RDI 0.0012 (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0012) 0.0006 (0.0012)
COH91RDI 0.0022 (0.0010)
** 0.0012 (0.0010) 0.0012 (0.0010)






















Log-likelihood -90025.33 -89624.85 -89577.87
Number of obs 132449 132449 132449
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Superscripts ‘ *’ and ‘ **’ denote significance
levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.16
IV. Concluding Remarks
Using the census data for Taiwanese manufacturing in 1981, 1986, 1991
and 1996, we first construct a longitudinal data set for all the firms that
appeared in the 1991 census. Firm level and industry-specific variables are
constructed, including age, size, and others to basically measure the degree of
entry barriers for each 4-digit industry. More importantly, we construct
R&D-related indexes, to reflect the technological regimes that have been
referred to by Neo-Schumpeterian economists, including those of creative
destruction (the entrepreneur regime) and creative accumulation (the
routinized regime)
By means of a Probit model, this paper aims to test the relationship
between the two technological regimes and the firms’survival rate as
addressed by the Schumpeterian school. That is, for the industry featured by
the entrepreneur regime, new firms can find more room to enter and survive.
On the contrary, for the industry characterized by innovations involving
creative accumulation or the so-called routinized regime, new firms face
higher entry barriers and thus should have a lower survival rate.
After controlling for other commonly adopted variables, including age,
size, the entry barrier index of capital intensity, the profit margin, the
concentration ratio, the profit-cost ratio and entry rates, our empirical results
confirm the theoretical relationship between the technological regimes and
survival rate of new firms, that is, new firms are more likely to survive under
the entrepreneur regime, but are less likely to do so under the routinized
regime.
Our empirical results also support the commonly found relationships in
the related literature, including: (1) age and size are positively related to the
survival rate, (2) the entry rate and capital intensity are negatively linked to
the survival rate, and (3) the profit margin, concentration of real output, and
minimum efficient scale are positively related to the survival rate.
Taken together, our paper can be regarded as a complement to the
existing literature by providing empirical evidence to explain why the
relationship between the new firm’ s survival varies from industry to industry.
In this line of the literature, the degree of innovative activity is found to play17
an important role in affecting the new entrant’ s viability. Our empirical
evidence suggests that the innovative activity can affect the survival rate of
new firms in either direction depending on the type of technological regime in
the underlying industry. Finally, this effect is larger within the younger
cohorts of firms than within the older ones.
Based on these results, some policy implications can be drawn. Policies
to promote entry can be effective or ineffective, depending on the type of
subsidies, and the characteristics of the regime of the industry. A lump-sum
subsidy or a financial loan to a new firm can promote entry for both types of
industries. However, a relatively larger subsidy may be required for an
industry with a routinized regime than for one with an entrepreneur regime,
simply because of the higher levels of entry barrier under the former regime.
Should a government choose R&D subsidies in attempting to promote entry,
this may not prove effective if the underlying industry is characterized as a
routinized regime. On the contrary, for an industry characterized as an
entrepreneur regime, a R&D subsidy can efficiently increase the likelihood
that a new firm will get a foothold in the market.
Notes
1. Empirical evidence against Gibrat’ s Law can also be found in Audretsch,
et al. (1999) by using Italian data. For a thorough survey of “ Gibrat’ s
legacy”and related empirical studies see also Sutton (1997), Caves (1998),
Lotti, et al. (2003) and Calvo (2006).
2. It should be noted that the personal characteristics of founders and
entrepreneurs, which are not available in our dataset used in this study,
may also be important in affecting the hazard rate as documented in the
literature of Bates (1990), Reid (1991), Storey (1994), Arrighetti and
Vivarelli (1999), Vivarelli (2004) and Masuda (2006). By the same token,
other models describe entrepreneurship as a self-employment choice where
current wages and expected profits from the new firm are compared (see
Vivarelli, 1991 and Foti and Vivarelli, 1994), once risk aversion is taken
into account (see Norton and Moore, 2006 and Cressy, 2006). For a recent
discussion and comparison of the various theories of entrepreneurship, see
Endres and Woods (2006).18
3. See Dosi (1981) and Winter (1984) for earlier studies on technology
regimes, showing how different opportunity and appropriability conditions
and relevant knowledge bases may lead to different patterns of industrial
evolution.
4. The minimum efficient scale is defined as the ratio of the median to the
mean of employment distribution for each 4-digit industry. This is the
same definition as that adopted by Baldwin and Scott (1987).
5. This is a hypothesis posited by Geroski (1995, p.21). A similar test is
conducted in Audretsch (1995).
6. In addition to the whole sample regression, we have also applied the probit
model to investigate the survival equation for each cohort for 1986, 1991
and 1996. Since one of the major concerns in this study is to see whether
the effect of R&D-related factors (technological regimes) on survival
differs for different cohorts, we suppress the reporting of results from the
sample involving a single cohort. However, the estimated results are
available upon request from the authors. In general, the sign of the
estimated coefficients are the same as those estimated from the pooled
sample, aside from some minor differences.19
Appendix: Correlation Coefficients among the Independent Variables
Table A1
Correlation Coefficients (N=129)
ENTR RDN RDI CORR PCM KQR HH MES
ENTR 1
RDN -0.00393 1
RDI -0.03195 -0.01074 1

















Note: The superscripts ‘ *’and ‘ **’denote significance levels of 10% and 5%,
respectively.20
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